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Abstract. Inspired by recent advances in coverage-guided analysis of
neural networks, we propose a novel anomaly detection method. We
show that the hidden activation values contain information useful to
distinguish between normal and anomalous samples. Our approach com-
bines three neural networks in a purely data-driven end-to-end model.
Based on the activation values in the target network, the alarm network
decides if the given sample is normal. Strong anomaly detection results
are achieved on common data sets surpassing current baseline methods.
Our semi-supervised anomaly detection method allows to inspect large
amounts of data for anomalies across various applications.
Keywords: anomaly detection · deep learning · intrusion detection ·
semi-supervised learning · coverage analysis · data mining · IT security
1 Introduction
Anomaly detection is the task of identifying data points that differ in their
behavior compared to the majority of samples. Reliable anomaly detection is of
great interest in many real-life scenarios, especially in the context of security-
sensitive systems. Here, anomalies can indicate attacks on the infrastructure,
fraudulent behavior, or general points of interest. In recent years, the number
of machine learning (ML) applications using deep learning (DL) concepts has
steadily grown. DL methods allow to analyze highly complex data for patterns
that are useful to minimize a certain loss function. Anomaly detection tasks are
especially challenging for DL methods due to the inherent class imbalance. In
research, anomaly detection is often only seen as unsupervised task, thus ignoring
the information gain when anomaly-related samples are available. In our work,
we develop a new DL-based anomaly detection method showing superior results
with only a handful of anomaly examples – and motivate that the very same
method also works without any anomaly examples at all.
In DL-based anomaly detection, a popular idea is to use an autoencoder
(AEs) to preprocess, or reconstruct the input. This type of neural network (NN)
generates an output that is close to the given input under the constraint of small
hidden dimensions. Intuitively, when trained on normal samples only, the AE will
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miss important features that distinguish anomalous samples, thus increasing the
reconstruction error. Clearly, this method assumes that the overall error is large
enough to be detected – however, anomalies may be too subtle to be detected
based on the output only. In our paper, we consider the entire system context by
analyzing more subtle patterns. We show that the hidden activations of autoen-
coders, but also other types of NNs, are useful to judge if the current input is
normal, or anomalous. By combining the information of three interrelated NNs,
we achieve strong detection results even in semi-supervised settings.
During the conceptual phase, we were inspired by coverage-guided neural
network testing techniques. In this new and promising research direction, soft-
ware testing concepts are transferred to DL models. The goal is to identify faulty
regions in NNs responsible for unusual behavior, or errors during run-time. Pei
et al. [23] first introduced the idea of neuron coverage to guide a testing process.
Since then, further improvements and modifications have been proposed, e.g., by
Ma et al. [16] and Sun et al. [38]. Recently, Sperl et al. [31] used this concept to
detect adversarial examples fed to NNs. The authors analyze the activation val-
ues while processing benign and adversarial inputs – a second network classifies
if the recorded patterns resemble normal behavior or an attack. In this paper,
we profit from this insight and further generalize the concept by adapting it
to the constraints of anomaly detection. Whereas samples for benign as well as
adversarial inputs are available in adversarial ML, anomaly detection is a semi-
supervised setting with only a few anomaly-related labels available. However,
also here we assume that NNs behave in a special and distinguishable manner,
when confronted with anomalous data. We show, this behavior is detectable by
analyzing the activation values during run-time. When observing the neuron
activations of NNs while processing normal inputs and synthetic anomalies, we
train another NN to distinguish the nature of the analyzed data points. Our anal-
ysis shows that even artificial anomalies train an anomaly detection model, that
performs well across multiple domains, and generalizes to yet unseen anomalies.
Applying our concept, we empirically show that anomalous samples cause
different hidden activations compared to normal ones. We analyze the hidden
layers of a so-called target network by an auxiliary network, called the alarm
network. With our anomaly network, we automatically generate samples used
during training of the alarm network to distinguish between normal and anoma-
lous samples. Our evaluation shows strong results for common data sets and
we report superior performance to common baseline methods. In Summary, we
make the following contributions:
– We propose a purely data-driven semi-supervised anomaly detection method
based on the analysis of the hidden activations of NNs which we call A3.
– Based on our thoroughly selected set of experiments across five different data
sets, we show that these patterns generalize to new anomaly types even with
only a few anomaly examples available.
– We motivate that our method works in settings where no anomaly samples
are available when using generative models as anomaly network.
A3: Activation Anomaly Analysis 3
2 Background and Related Work
2.1 Nomenclature
Neural networks approximate an input-output mapping f(x;θ) = y based on
the learned parameters θ. The overall function f = fL ◦ . . . ◦ f1 consists of
multiple layers fi. For easier readability, we summarize the input-output relation
as f : x 7→ y. Generally, we denote the output, or activation, of the ith layer as
hi = σ(Wi,i−1 ·hi−1+bi). Here σ(·) is a non-linear activation function,Wi,j and
bi the mapping parameters learned in layer i with respect to layer j. The input
corresponds to x = h0. Thus, the activations simply become a function hi(x;θ)
dependent on the input and the network parameters up to the respective layer.
The weights θi are determined by an optimization algorithm minimizing the
expected loss between the desired and estimated output, L(y, yˆ). Our entire
data set D = {(xk,yk)},xk ∈ X ,yk ∈ Y is split into three parts: training,
validation, and test. The network weights are adapted to the training set while
evaluating the performance on the validation set. We consider categorical data,
y ∈ {1, 2, . . . |Y|}, where Y denotes the set of available labels. Among other
things, we evaluate the transferability of A3, i.e., the performance of the model
evaluated on more labels than it was trained on, Ytrain ⊂ Ytest.
2.2 Related Work
Anomaly detection is a topic of active research with a diversity of use cases
and applied techniques. For instance, in network intrusion detection [18], power
grids [30], or industrial control systems [10], automated mechanisms can improve
the security of the overall system. A good overview on anomaly detection in
general and deep learning based systems particularly is given in the surveys [4]
and [3], respectively. Note that the term “semi-supervised” is often ambiguous in
anomaly detection. We follow the surveys’ notation, thus calling any knowledge
about the underlying labels semi-supervised, e.g., also when the training data is
assumed to be normal. Famous unsupervised methods include OC-SVMs [27],
or Isolation Forests [15].
In DL-based anomaly detection systems, a popular choice are architectures
incorporating an AE, often used as feature extractor. AEs are combined with
classical machine learning classifiers like k-nearest neighbor [35], OC-SVMs for
anomaly detection [2], NN-based classifiers [25], or Gaussian Mixture Models
[39]. Similarly, other feature extraction networks like recurrent NNs have been
evaluated [17,20,28]. To detect anomalies, AEs may also be used in their purest
form: to restore the input under the constraint of small hidden layers, similar to
classical dimensionality reduction methods like PCA. The reconstruction error
of samples can then be used to discriminate between normal and anomalous
data points [35,37]. Research has further analyzed how to improve the anomaly
detection results, e.g., by iteratively adding human feedback [9, 34].
Over the past decades, computing power and data storage have steadily risen.
DL methods profit from the increased amount of training samples. Recent re-
search [21, 26] has studied ways to incorporate known anomalies into DL-based
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anomaly detection. They show that even a few anomaly labels, which are usually
available in practice, significantly improve the overall detection performance. In
our work, we show that the activations differ for normal and anomalous samples.
Using our method, we are able to detect known and even new, yet unseen types
of anomalies in different scenarios with high confidence. With our framework,
we significantly improve NN-driven semi-supervised anomaly detection systems.
3 Methodology
Based on the activations of a neural network f , we present the following hypoth-
esis building the foundation of our paper:
Evaluating the activations hi of a neural network trained on the data
set Dtrain, we observe special patterns that allow to distinguish between
classes the network has been trained on, and unknown classes yi /∈ Ytrain.
We argue that this setting is analog to anomaly detection. An anomaly is defined
as a sample different to normal data in some unspecified behavior. When Dtrain
describes the normal data, then any point of a yet unknown class yi /∈ Ytrain
defines an anomaly, i.e., a sample that does not belong to a normal class.
3.1 Architecture
Our goal is to map the input to a binary output; either the sample is normal
(label 0) or anomalous (label 1). We achieve this with our new anomaly detection
method comprising three parts. Whereas the target, and alarm network are
closely related to the adversarial example detection method of Sperl et al. [31],
we additionally add an anomaly network.
1. The target network performs a task unrelated to anomaly detection. In ac-
cordance to our assumption, the classes the target was trained on are con-
sidered normal. Several architectures of the target are possible – we evaluate
fully-connected as well as convolutional autoencoders and classifiers.
2. The anomaly network generates counterexamples based on the normal in-
puts, used to train the alarm network. We show that even a random number
generator as anomaly network gives state-of-the art results when combined
with the target and alarm network. Furthermore, we motivate that a gener-
ative model eliminates the need for anomaly-related labels.
3. The alarm network evaluates if the given sample is normal or anomalous by
observing the hidden activations of the target network. While training, the
activations of normal inputs as well as synthetic anomalies from the anomaly
network are considered.
Both parts are combined to one connected architecture. In the scope of this
paper, we fix the target network to its pretrained state. We consider its acti-
vations caused by the input, htarget,i(x;θtarget). Our assumption is that these
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x & x¯ xˆ
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Alarm Network
Fig. 1: A3 consists of three parts: 1) a target network unrelated to anomaly
detection (e.g., an autoencoder), 2) the alarm network judging if the input x is
normal, and 3) the anomaly network providing anomalous counterexamples x¯.
The three parts are connected to one overall network.
activations show particular patterns for samples the target network was trained
on (i.e., normal samples), and for other samples (i.e., anomalous samples). The
alarm network then finds anomaly-related patterns in the target network’s acti-
vations. A high level overview is given in Figure 1.
3.2 Training Phase
Target Network The target network performs a task unrelated to anomaly
detection on the input x. We evaluate autoencoders, ftarget : x 7→ xˆ, and classi-
fiers, ftarget : x 7→ y ∈ {1, . . . , |Y|}. According to our fundamental assumption,
all samples used in the training are considered normal.
Anomaly Network The anomaly network transforms the inputs to an anomaly,
not resembling the normal data, fanomaly : x 7→ x¯. Thus, in accordance with
the semi-supervised setting, no information about the distribution of anomalous
samples is necessary. The here generated samples are fed in the target network.
In our evaluation, we transform the input to a random realization of a normal
distribution of the same dimension, i.e., x¯ ∼ N (µ, σ2). As further outlook, we
use a variational autoencoder (VAE) [13], i.e., an autoencoder encoding the in-
put to the inner states hµ and hσ forming Gaussian posteriors. Here, anomaly
samples are generated by adding Gaussian noise N (0, 5) to hµ, i.e., by sampling
highly improbable samples based on the learned distribution.
Alarm Network The alarm network maps the input to its anomaly probabil-
ity. However, it does not operate on the input directly, but observes the target
network’s activations caused by the input:
falarm : [htarget,1(x;θtarget), . . . ,htarget,L−1(x;θtarget)] 7→ yˆ ∈ [0, 1].
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Fig. 2: We train the target network on the training data deemed as normal.
While training the alarm network, it analyzes the hidden activations caused by
the input, and synthetic anomalies by the alarm network. For new data points,
the target’s activations are evaluated by the alarm network.
Hence, the output is implicitly dependent on the input and the network weights
of the target and alarm model, yˆ(x;θtarget,θalarm). Thanks to the combination
of the target, anomaly, and alarm network A3 even works when there are only a
few anomalous samples available. Further we motivate, with a suitable generative
anomaly model, no anomaly samples at all is necessary.
Loss Function The alarm network is optimized on predicting the respective
training labels, and anomalous when given the target’s activations caused by the
synthetic anomalous samples x¯ by the anomaly network. We fixed the weight
parameter between these objectives to µ = 0.1. Let Lx(y, yˆ) denote the binary
cross-entropy, the overall loss becomes L(y, yˆ) = Lx(y, yˆ(x)) + µ · Lx(1, yˆ(x¯)).
3.3 Prediction Phase
During the prediction phase, the target and the alarm network act as one com-
bined system, mapping the input to a confidence interval: fdetect : x 7→ yˆ ∈ [0, 1].
The input is transformed by the very same pipeline: x gives rise to particular
activations in the target, htarget,i(x;θtarget). Based on the target’s activations,
the alarm network decides whether the input is more likely to be normal, or
anomalous. Figure 2 gives an overview about the training and prediction phase.
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4 Experiments
4.1 Data Sets
To evaluate the performance of our anomaly detection system we chose pub-
licly available and commonly used data sets allowing the comparison to related
work. Furthermore, we considered real world data sets and thus evaluated the
applicability in complex scenarios. We chose the following five data sets:
1. MNIST [14]: common image data set for ML problems with 70 000 images
showing ten handwritten digits.
2. EMNIST [8]: extension of MNIST with handwritten letters.
3. NSL-KDD [33]: common data set with around 150 000 samples. We use
KDDTest+ for testing containing new anomalies unseen in the training set.
4. Credit Card Transactions [24]: anonymized credit card data of around
285 000 transactions of which 492 being fraudulent.
5. CSE-CIC-IDS2018 [29]: large network data set. We omit the DDoS data
due to the high resource demands. Around five million samples remain.
We limit the preprocessing to minmax-scaling numerical and 1-Hot-encoding cat-
egorical data. Samples still containing non-numerical values are omitted. Gener-
ally, we took 80% of the data for training, 5% for validation, and 15% for testing.
If a test set is given, we used it instead.
4.2 Baseline Methods
We compared the performance of A3 to four common baseline methods. Note
that we only considered baseline methods that scale to the large amount of data.
Isolation Forest (IF) IF is a commonly used unsupervised anomaly detection
method by Liu et al. [15]. Based on the given data, an ensemble of random
trees is built. The average path length results in an anomaly score. We used the
implementation provided by scikit-learn [22] along with the default parameters.
Autoencoder Reconstruction Threshold When trained on normal data only, there
is a measurable difference in the reconstruction error of autoencoders when an
anomalous sample is fed in. We used the mean squared error, i.e., L(x, xˆ) =
‖xˆ− x‖22, to quantify this difference. As some target networks use an autoen-
coder architecture, we used the very same models for this baseline.
Deep Autoencoding Gaussian Mixture Model (DAGMM) DAGMM is a state-of-
the-art unsupervised DL-based anomaly detection method by Zong et al. [39].
The authors combine information of an autoencoder with a Gaussian mixture
model. In accordance with their first set of experiments, we only used normal
samples for the training. For all experiments, we used the implementation by
Nakae [19], and the architecture recommended for the KDDCUP data set.
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Deviation Networks (DevNet) DevNet is a state-of-the-art semi-supervised DL-
based anomaly detection method by Pang et al. [21]. The anomaly detection is
split between a feature learner and an anomaly score learner, both implemented
as an NN. The anomaly scorer learns to score normal samples close to a Gaussian
prior distribution, and enforces a minimum distance to anomalous samples. As
recommended by the authors, we used their default architecture.
4.3 Anomaly Detection Constraints
Special constraints apply in the setting of anomaly detection. With our experi-
ments, we show that the developed theory performs well nonetheless.
1. Scarcity of anomaly samples. Generally, many samples are required for strong
performance using DL frameworks. However, there is a natural imbalance
in anomaly detection scenarios: most data samples are normal, only a few
examples of anomalies were found manually. We show that our anomaly
detection algorithm performs well in this semi-supervised setting.
2. Variable extend of abnormality. Anomalous samples are not bound by a com-
mon behavior or magnitude of anomaly. By definition, the only difference is
that anomalies do not resemble normal samples. We show the transferabil-
ity of our algorithm, i.e., known anomalies during training also reveal yet
unknown anomalies during testing.
3. Driven by data, not expert knowledge. A suitable anomaly detection algo-
rithm should be applicable to multiple settings, even when no expert knowl-
edge is available. Performance that is only achievable using domain knowl-
edge, may result in inferior results in other settings. We show that our al-
gorithm generalizes to other settings, i.e., uses the data itself to distinguish
between normal and anomalous behavior.
4.4 Experimental Setup
We designed multiple experiments to show that A3 works under all three con-
straints. An overview is given in Table 1.
Experiment 1: Detection of Known Anomalies Considering constraint 1, we eval-
uated the fundamental assumption of our method, i.e.: the activation values
of the target network contain information to distinguish between normal and
anomalous samples. It is important to remember that only the alarm network,
not the target, is trained on the anomaly detection task. We limited the train
anomaly samples to {5, 25, 50, 100} randomly selected instances in accordance
with the semi-supervised setting. Note, this limitation may cause some classes
not to be present during training.
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Table 1: Experiments exploring the detection of known & unknown anomalies.
Data Normal Train Anomaly ⊆ Test Anomaly
1a&4a MNIST 0, . . . , 5 6, 7 6, 7
1b&4c MNIST 4, . . . , 9 0, 1 0, 1
1c NSL-KDD Normal DoS, Probe DoS, Probe
1d NSL-KDD Normal R2L, U2R R2L, U2R
1e IDS Benign BF, Web, DoS, Infil. BF, Web, DoS, Infil.
1f IDS Benign Bot, Infil., Web, DoS Bot, Infil., Web, DoS
1g CC Normal Fraudulent Fraudulent
2a&4b MNIST 0, . . . , 5 6, 7 6, 7, 8, 9
2b&4d MNIST 4, . . . , 9 0, 1 0, 1, 2, 3
2c NSL-KDD Normal DoS, Probe DoS, Probe, R2L, U2R
2d NSL-KDD Normal R2L, U2R R2L, U2R, DoS, Probe
2e IDS Benign BF, Web, DoS, Infil. BF, Web, DoS, Infil., Bot
2f IDS Benign Bot, Infil., Web, DoS Bot, Infil., Web, DoS, BF
3a (E-)MNIST 0, . . . , 9 A, B, C, D, E A, B, C, D, E
3b (E-)MNIST 0, . . . , 9 A, B, C, D, E A, B, C, D, E, V, W, X, Y, Z
3c (E-)MNIST 0, . . . , 9 V, W, X, Y, Z V, W, X, Y, Z
3d (E-)MNIST 0, . . . , 9 V, W, X, Y, Z A, B, C, D, E, V, W, X, Y, Z
Experiment 2: Transferability to Unknown Anomalies Considering constraints 1
and 2, we evaluated the transferability of our fundamental assumption, i.e.: the
activation values of the target network are inherently different for normal and
anomalous samples. Similar to experiment 1, we evaluated the detection perfor-
mance bound by the scarcity of anomaly labels. Furthermore, the test data set
contained more anomaly classes than the alarm network has been trained on. In
other words, we tried to find anomalies that follow a different nature and data
distribution than the one of the few known samples.
Experiment 3: Generality of the Method Considering constraints 1, 2, and 3,
we evaluated the generality of our fundamental assumption, i.e.: the activation
values of any type of target network contain information to distinguish between
normal and anomalous samples. We used a publicly available classifier as target,
extracted the activation values, and tested whether these can be used to detect
known as well as unknown anomalies. Hence, we motivate that our anomaly
detection mechanism can be applied to already existing target networks and
environments of any type.
Experiment 4: Outlook to Unsupervised Anomaly Detection Considering the ex-
treme case of constraint 1, we made first evaluations of the detection performance
when no labeled anomalous samples are available during training. We solely used
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Table 2: Dimensionality of the layers. All layers are activated by ReLUs.
Data Set Target Architecture Alarm Architecture
MNIST according to [6] 1000, 500, 200, 75, 1
NSL-KDD 200, 100, 50, 25, 50, 100, 200 1000, 500, 200, 75, 1
IDS 150, 80, 40, 20, 40, 80, 150 1000, 500, 200, 75, 1
CreditCard 50, 25, 10, 5, 10, 25, 50 1000, 500, 200, 75, 1
MNIST & EMNIST according to [5] 1000, 500, 200, 75, 1
normal samples, as well as the outputs of a generative anomaly network in order
to train our system.
4.5 Experiment Overview
An overview about the used architectures for each experiment is found in Table 2.
For the symmetric AE-based target models, we chose the first layer to be slightly
larger than the dimension of the input vectors, whereas the hidden representation
should be smaller. For the sake of simplicity, we used a common alarm model ar-
chitecture throughout this paper. Note that for the MNIST-related experiments,
we considered two publicly available target model architectures from Keras [7],
i.e., a convolution AE [6] extended by a dropout layer for experiment 1 and 4,
as well as a CNN [5] for experiment 3. This underlines the generality of our
method. All layers are activated by ReLUs.
Parameter Choices Based on a non-exhaustive parameter search on MNIST, we
chose the following global optimizer settings: Adam [12] with a learning rate of
0.001 for the target network, and 0.00001 for the alarm network was used. The
training was stopped after 30, and 60 epochs, respectively. No other regularizer
than 10% dropout [32] before the last layer was used. To support further research,
we open-source our code1.
Anomaly Network For experiments 1, 2, & 3, we used a simple Gaussian noise
generator as anomaly network. As all inputs are within [0, 1], we fixed the noise
parameters to N (.5, 1). For experiment 4, we chose the use of a VAE with the
dense hidden layers 800, 400, 100, 25, 100, 400, 800. During the training of the
target network, it was adapted to reconstruct the normal samples.
5 Results and Evaluation
In the following, we present and evaluate the results measured during our exper-
iments. We show the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, i.e., the true
1 We attached the code, and are happy to open-source it after the internal approval.
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Fig. 3: ROC curves showing the true positive rate vs. the false positive rate evalu-
ated on the validation set for several experiments. For A3, we capped the amount
of anomaly samples during training. We used a noise generator (N ) as anomaly
network, and for experiments 4a-d a VAE.
positive rate (TPR) as a function of the false positive rate (TPR), evaluated on
the validation sets. For the final results, evaluated on the test sets, we use the
average precision (AP), and the area under the ROC-curve (AUC) as metrics to
be consistent with the related work [21]. Whereas the AP quantifies the trade-off
between precision and recall, the AUC measures the trade-off between the TPR
and FPR. Both metrics are independent of the chosen detection threshold, and
thus give a good overview about the general detection performance.
5.1 Validation Results
In Figure 3, we show the ROC curves of the first experiments for each validation
data set. To simulate real-life conditions, where usually just a few anomaly sam-
ples are available, we restricted the known anomalies to {5, 25, 50, 100}. Note,
these anomalies are sampled randomly from all available validation anomaly
samples – it could well be that they are restricted to one class. We report that
our method generally follows an intuitive behavior: the more known anomalies
are used, the better the anomaly detection performance. Even for 5 samples an
adequate performance is possible on most data sets. As little as 25 samples are
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Table 3: Test results given all normal, and 100 anomaly samples.
A3 AE IF DAGMM DevNet
AP AUC AP AUC AP AUC AP AUC AP AUC
1a .98±.00 .99±.00 .44±.04 .69±.03 .27±.02 .56±.02 .71±.01 .85±.01 .96±.01 .98±.00
1b .99±.00 1.0±.00 .25±.03 .40±.04 .42±.02 .53±.01 .34±.03 .64±.04 .98±.01 .99±.01
1c .96±.01 .96±.01 .96±.01 .96±.00 .98±.00 .97±.00 .90±.04 .94±.01 .95±.01 .96±.01
1d .76±.04 .88±.05 .51±.04 .81±.02 .48±.02 .84±.00 .59±.03 .90±.01 .78±.03 .88±.04
1e .89±.03 .94±.01 .73±.12 .83±.14 .17±.01 .46±.03 .63±.13 .87±.08 .89±.01 .93±.00
1f .90±.01 .94±.01 .57±.11 .84±.06 .13±.00 .35±.03 .43±.16 .73±.13 .73±.04 .90±.00
1g .78±.09 .96±.01 .52±.09 .97±.00 .15±.04 .96±.01 .38±.25 .96±.02 .76±.04 .98±.01
2a .87±.03 .88±.03 .63±.02 .72±.02 .40±.01 .54±.02 .69±.01 .75±.02 .82±.02 .82±.03
2b .92±.02 .92±.02 .61±.01 .63±.01 .61±.01 .64±.01 .61±.01 .72±.02 .90±.03 .90±.04
2c .94±.01 .92±.02 .94±.01 .93±.01 .96±.00 .94±.00 .91±.03 .93±.01 .94±.00 .92±.01
2d .94±.03 .92±.03 .94±.01 .93±.01 .96±.00 .94±.00 .91±.03 .93±.01 .89±.02 .88±.03
2e .87±.02 .90±.03 .80±.05 .91±.02 .19±.01 .44±.02 .48±.12 .73±.11 .83±.02 .90±.01
2f .90±.03 .93±.02 .81±.07 .90±.03 .19±.01 .44±.02 .57±.06 .81±.05 .82±.02 .92±.00
3a .98±.01 .99±.01 - - .85±.01 .93±.00 .83±.03 .93±.01 .99±.01 .99±.00
3b .97±.01 .96±.01 - - .89±.01 .91±.01 .93±.01 .95±.00 .98±.00 .98±.00
3c .99±.00 .99±.00 - - .79±.02 .89±.01 .90±.01 .96±.00 .96±.01 .98±.01
3d .95±.02 .95±.02 - - .89±.01 .91±.01 .93±.01 .95±.00 .95±.03 .94±.04
needed to surpass the performance of the state-of-the-art unsupervised anomaly
detection methods.
Moreover, A3 surpasses, or matches the performances of the state-of-the-art
semi-supervised anomaly detection method. An important feature is the steep
rise of the TPR, thus less false positives are seen for strong detection perfor-
mance. To choose a suitable detection threshold in practice, a very low FPR has
to be tolerated using our method. This significantly reduces manual work, and
builds trust in the detection results.
5.2 Test Results
In Table 3, we summarize the results of our experiments using the test data sets
for four passes. To simulate real-life conditions, we limit the amount of available
anomalies to 100 randomly chosen samples of the training set. We report that A3
performs well even under this strict setting. It well surpasses the unsupervised
baseline methods, and on most experiments also the semi-supervised baseline
method. The performance remains strong across all data sets and experiments.
We conclude that our main fundamental assumption, i.e., the hidden activations
of NNs carry information useful to anomaly detection, is well supported.
Moreover, we see strong evidence for the hypotheses made throughout the ex-
periments. In experiment 1, we tried to find known anomalies. The test results
A3: Activation Anomaly Analysis 13
Table 4: Test result for exp. 4, where no anomaly samples were used to train A3.
4a-AP 4a-AUC 4b-AP 4b-AUC 4c-AP 4c-AUC 4d-AP 4d-AUC
.95±.01 .98±.00 .81±.27 .84±.23 .53±.04 .67±.05 .57±.13 .61±.11
show the highest results for this setting, thus our method very well identifies
suitable patterns for this task. These patterns generalize well to yet unseen pat-
terns as shown in experiment 2. Although, only parts of the test anomalies are
known during training, strong results are achieved. Whereas the aforementioned
experiments used deep & convolution autoencoders as target network, we gen-
eralize the setting to deep classifiers in experiment 3. Also here, superior results
are achieved. We conclude that A3 is able to detect known, and yet unknown
anomalies with high confidence, and is flexible enough to adapt to a wide range
of environments.
5.3 Outlook to Unsupervised Anomaly Detection
In a supplementary experiment, we further motivated that A3 performs well
even when no anomaly sample is available. For this, we chose a generative model
as anomaly network, a VAE in our case. In Figure 3, we see a superior perfor-
mance on the validation set compared to other unsupervised anomaly detection
methods. We summarize our results on the test set in Table 4. We assume that
sampling from the improbable distribution regions, which the VAE has learned,
is a suitable way to generate counterexamples useful to the alarm network. How-
ever, the high variance for the transfer experiment shows that more parameter
tuning is needed to achieve consistent performance. Future research may lever-
age these results to a more general setting. We are happy to report consistently
strong results when using a simple noise generator as anomaly network shown
in experiment 1, 2, & 3.
6 Discussion & Future Work
In this paper, we built an anomaly detection method based on the analysis
of hidden activations. By observing the activations of an NN that was trained
on a task unrelated to anomaly detection, we take all context information it
has learned into consideration. Future research may leverage this method to
other use-cases, and further streamline the proposed intuitions. A3 shows strong
anomaly detection results for all five analyzed data sets across all experiments.
We motivate that the activation analysis generalizes to yet unseen anomalies
across different network architectures. Thanks to the modularity of our concept,
various architectures may be used as target, alarm or anomaly networks covering
numerous types of data and use-cases. Future work may integrate other powerful
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architectures, e.g., generative adversarial networks [11] as already applied to
other anomaly detection settings [1,36]. We emphasize the real-life applicability
by limiting the amount of anomaly samples during training. In practice, often a
few known anomalies are available, e.g., by manual exploration, or unsupervised
methods. Good performance was already achieved with a handful of anomaly
samples. During our research, we saw further improvements with a shifted output
regularizer, e.g., Lreg(y) = λ · |1− y|, favoring the detection of anomalies. Future
work may evaluate and combine these ideas.
7 Conclusion
We introduce a novel approach for anomaly detection called A3 based on the hid-
den activation patterns of NNs. Our architecture comprises three parts: a target
network unrelated to the anomaly detection task, an alarm network analyzing
the target’s activations, and an anomaly network generating anomalous train-
ing samples. Our framework works under common assumptions and constraints
typically found in anomaly detection tasks. We assume that anomalous training
samples are scarce, and new types of anomalies exist during deployment. With
our evaluation, we provide strong evidence that our method works on different
target network architectures and generalizes to yet unseen anomalous samples.
Furthermore, we detect anomalies across different types of data sets with a re-
stricted amount or even no labeled anomalies at all during training. We present
a valuable semi-supervised NN-based anomaly detection framework providing a
purely data-driven solution for a variety of use cases.
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